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THE INTERSECTION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
AND THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Suzanne Solomon *
This Note reviews the history, structure,andpurpose of 42 U.S. C. § 1983
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). It then
describes how the two statutes intersect and interact. Next, this Note
examines the existing split in the U.S. Courts of Appeals regarding the
availability of § 1983 as a remedy for violations of the IDEA. This Note
ultimately contends that Congress intended § 1983 suits to prevail under
the IDEA and argues that school districts will be deterredfrom violating
the statute'sprovisions ifsuch suits are allowed to proceed.
INTRODUCTION

A child with dyslexia enrolled as a second-grade student in the Jersey
City Public Schools in September 1988.1 Because his learning disability
was never diagnosed by the school district, the student was still unable to
read, write, and spell as a twenty-year-old tenth grader. In 1997, three years
before the student began receiving special educational services, his
grandmother filed a complaint with the New Jersey Department of
Education (NJDOE) on behalf of the student and others similarly situated.
After an investigation, the NJDOE issued a report concluding that the
school district was out of compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) 2 because it had failed to demonstrate that it was
meeting the needs of classified disabled pupils. Despite this finding, the
student was not granted any immediate relief.
In 2001, the student brought a § 19833 action seeking monetary damages,
claiming that his rights under the IDEA were violated. 4 In 2007, ten years
after proceedings were initiated, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third

J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I am most grateful for the help
of Professor Aaron Saiger and Professor and Librarian Laurence Abraham.
1. The facts presented in this paragraph arise from A. W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schools,
486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Additional facts can be found in the lower court's
decision, A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, No. 01-CV-140 (WGB), 2002 WL 1065685, at
*2-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2002).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000); see infra Part I.A.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see infra Part I.B.
4. Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 793; see infra Part II.C.2.
*
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"[did] not allege[] an actionable violation of his
Circuit held that the student
'5
IDEA."
the
rights under
Today, questions of whether children with disabilities are receiving the
level of education guaranteed to them by law persist, as does the question of
the appropriate remedy when their rights have been violated. The unsettled
issue of whether a plaintiff can sustain a § 1983 action to enforce rights
guaranteed by the IDEA has created a split among the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. 6 Part I of this Note reviews the history, structure, and purpose of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and of the IDEA. It then describes how the two statutes
intersect and interact. Part II examines the current split among the Courts
of Appeals and highlights the Third Circuit's recently revised approach to
IDEA rights under § 1983. Finally, Part III of this Note contends that
Congress intended § 1983 damages actions to prevail under the IDEA. This
Part also argues that by allowing § 1983 suits to proceed under the IDEA,
school districts will be deterred from violating it, resulting in increased
compliance with the statute and, ultimately, increased quality in education
for the disabled.
I. THE INTERSECTION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND THE IDEA
A. Overview of the IDEA
1. Origins
Two decades after the U.S. Supreme Court declared education to be
' '7
"perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,
more than "half of the Nation's 8 million disabled children were not
receiving appropriate educational services." 8 In the early 1970s, two cases,
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia9 and Pennsylvania
Associationfor Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,' 0 commonly referred to
as "landmark" decisions in education disability rights, caught the attention
of the public, and called for change in the laws governing the education of
students with disabilities." At the time these cases were decided, laws in
Pennsylvania and Washington D.C., permitted public schools to deny
admission to children with an I.Q. below seventy until they reached the age

5. Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 806; see infra Part II.C.2.
6. See infra Part II.
7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
8. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988) (citation omitted).
9. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
10. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
11. See Rebecca L. Bouchard, Education Law-The Relationship Between the
Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act and Section 1983: Are Compensatory Damages
an Available and Appropriate Remedy?, 25 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 301, 311-12 & nn.75-76
(2003).
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of eight. 12 In response, the courts held that disabled youth had a
constitutional right to a free public education.13
In 1975, newly alerted to this crisis in public education, Congress
conducted a study revealing that "the educational needs of 82 percent of all
children with emotional disabilities went unmet." 14 Congressional research
indicated that 1.75 million of the 8 million children with disabilities were
not receiving any educational services, and that 2.5 million disabled youth
were not receiving an appropriate education. 15 In addition to spending
billions of dollars annually on an ineffective education system, the
on care for adults with disabilities in
government was spending billions
16
long-term public institutions.
Students with disabilities who were not excluded from the system were
often either assigned to separate classrooms or left in mainstream classesundiagnosed and not learning. 17 Not surprisingly, as a result of their
frustration with the system, some of these disadvantaged youth were
dropping out of school-at great cost to their parents and society. 18 As a
result of these startling findings, Congress passed the Education for All
in 1975.19 In 1990,
Handicapped Children Act, the IDEA's predecessor,
20
the Act was revised and given its current name.
2. Objectives
The ultimate goal of the IDEA is "to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
21
unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living."
The statute offers federal funds to states, localities, and other educational
agencies that implement its provisions. 22 In order to receive funds,
Congress requires that state and local educational agencies under the
IDEA 23 establish procedures to ensure that a free, appropriate education is
available to all children with disabilities residing in that locality between
the ages of three and twenty-one. 24 One such procedure is the development
of an individualized education program (IEP) for each child with a

12. See id. at 311 n.75.
13. See id. (citing Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander, American Public School Law
440 (5th ed. 2001)).
14. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988) (citation omitted).
15. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432.
16. See id. at 8-9.
17. See Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, a Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in
Special Education Lawsuits, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 465, 472-73 (2002).
18. See id. at 473; Bouchard, supra note 11, at 312.
19. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 312.
20. See id. at 313.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000).
22. See id. § 1412(a).
23. See id. § 1400(d)(1)(C).
24. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
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disability. The IEP sets out the child's educational performance, establishes
annual goals, and describes the educational program designed to enable the
child to meet those individualized goals. 25 In addition, the statute calls for
children with disabilities to be educated in the least restrictive environment.
Only when the severity of the disability "is such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily"26 should a child be removed from the regular educational
environment.
3. Processes
The IDEA process begins with a "referral" for an evaluation, as the
school system has an obligation to try to identify those children within their
27
district who may have disabilities-a process called "child find."
Children may also be evaluated at the request of a parent. 28 The results of
the evaluation are studied by a task force composed of parents and school
district personnel. If the evaluation indicates a disability and a need for
special services, an IEP will be prepared that specifically describes the
child's needs, placement, and educational goals, 29 to which the parent must
consent. 30 If no disability is identified, the student will not be eligible for
services under the IDEA. 3 1 A parent can appeal the findings or may seek
32
an independent evaluation.
4. Procedural Safeguards
The IDEA established a system of procedural safeguards to guarantee
parents of disabled children direct participation in the process. 33 Section
1415(a) provides for "procedures . . . to ensure that children with
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with
respect to the provision of free appropriate public education." 34 In addition
to being guaranteed direct participation in the special education process,
parents have the right to receive an impartial due process hearing after filing
a complaint relating to the school's provision of a free, appropriate
education. 35 The hearing must be held and the decision must be issued
promptly-generally within forty-five days. 36 Both the parents and the
25. See id. §§ 1401(11), 1414(d)(1)(A).

26. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
27. Id. § 1412(a)(3); see Seligmann, supra note 17, at 474.
28. 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(b) (2007).
29. See Seligmann, supra note 17, at 475.

30. Otherwise, the last placement of the child that was agreed upon remains effective
until a new agreement is reached. This is codified in the IDEA's "stay-put" provision at 20
U.S.C.
31.
32.
33.

§ 1415(j) (2000). See Seligmann, supra note 17, at 476 & n.61.
See Seligmann, supra note 17, at 475.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), (6).
See id. § 1415.

34. Id. § 1415(a).
35. Id. § 1415(f).

36. 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2007).
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school can seek administrative review of the hearing. 37 Finally, either party
may file a civil action in state or federal court and obtain relief, if
appropriate. 38 The term "appropriate relief' ' 39 has included injunctive and
declaratory relief,40 attorneys' fees, 4 143reimbursement for educational
expenses, 42 and compensatory education.
B. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code is part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871.44 Its goal was to provide remedies for civil rights violations
against African Americans after the Civil War. 4 5 Although the statute's
primary purpose was to remediate the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, the
bill also provides a remedy to claimants seeking redress for violations by
46
individuals acting under color of law who refuse to enforce a state law.
After its passage, few lawsuits were filed using § 1983. However,
beginning in the 1960s and continuing today, the statute is commonly used
to redress a wide array of rights violations 47 and provides the basis for most
of the litigation against local governments and officials acting under color
of law.4 8 Section 1983 provides, in part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
49
other proper proceeding for redress ....
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g).
38. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
39. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii).
40. See, e.g., Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); see
also Bouchard, supra note 11, at 317.
41. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
42. See, e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70
(1985) (providing tuition reimbursement to the parents for the private school education costs
they incurred during the time that their challenge to the public school district was under
review, and noting that, without reimbursement, remedial rights under the IDEA would be
only an "empty victory"); see also Seligmann, supra note 17, at 479-81 & nn.77-93.
Congress codified the Burlington framework in the 1997 amendment to IDEA. See Perry A.
Zirkel, CompensatoryEducation Under the Individuals with DisabilitiesEducationAct: The
Third Circuit's PartiallyMis-Leading Position, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 879, 890 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that a
compensatory education is a natural result of Burlington and should not turn on the parent's
ability to pay the costs); see also Seligmann, supra note 17, at 481-82.
44. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 304.
45. See id.
46. See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Award of Section 1983 Damages Under the IDEA, 183
Educ. L. Rep. 313, 314 (2004) (citing Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335, 374-76
(1871)).
47. See id.
48. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 304.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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Section 1983 creates remedies and not substantive rights. 50 When the
bill was first enacted, § 1983 was primarily used to remedy constitutional
rights violations. 5 1 The Supreme Court, with limitations, has since
be used to redress a variety of federal statutory
determined that § 1983 can
52
rights violations as well.
Violation of a federal statute by itself does not guarantee the availability
of § 1983;53 rather, the relevant statutory provision must confer an
individually enforceable right. 54 Once it has been determined that such a
right exists, it is presumptively enforceable by § 1983. 55 However, this
presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the relevant provision
alleged to have been violated expressly 56 or implicitly 57 forecloses a
remedy under § 1983.
In addition to bringing suits based on both the "Constitution and laws,"
plaintiffs can also bring a § 1983 claim against a "person." 58 The Supreme
Court has held that officials of a governmental body may be sued under §
1983, and that, for purposes of § 1983 litigation, a municipality (and
municipal governmental institutions) constitutes a "person." 59 Therefore,
local school districts can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive
relief.60 Local and state officials may be sued in their "personal" capacity
under § 1983 to impose personal liability on the officer for actions
61
occurring under color of state law and with the badge of state authority.
Furthermore, courts have found officials liable under a theory of
62
supervisory liability based on a supervisor's own acts or omissions,

50. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
51. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 305.
52. See id.
53. See id.at 305 n.27.
54. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002).
55. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (holding that
"absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to
award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal
statute").
56. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 n.4 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). Gonzaga cited Wright for the proposition that Congress
can foreclose a § 1983 remedy via "specific evidence from the statute itself." Id.
57. Id.at 285 n.4 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)). Gonzaga
cited Blessing for the proposition that Congress can also foreclose a § 1983 remedy by
creating a "comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual
enforcement under § 1983." Id.
58. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 306.
59. See Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Bouchard,
supra note 11, at 307.
60. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Bouchard, supra note 11, at 307.
61. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Bouchard, supra note 11, at 309;
Wenkart, supra note 46, at 315. States and state officials cannot be sued in their official
capacity because of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, except where a
claimant is seeking injunctive relief. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
70-71 (1989).
62. See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that supervisory
liability is not based on the theory of respondeat superior); Bouchard, supra note 11, at 310.
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including failure to remedy, gross negligence, or deliberate indifference. 63
Thus, a parent of a disabled child can pursue a § 1983 claim against a
64
special education director.
Courts may award monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief under §
1983,65 as well as attorneys' fees. 66 The Supreme Court has also allowed
an award of punitive damages under the statute in a proceeding against an
individual where the official acted with malicious intent or willful disregard
67
of a plaintiff's rights.
C. The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Use of§ 1983 in IDEA Claims
and Congress'sSubsequent Actions
In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Robinson that the IDEA
was the exclusive avenue through which a parent could pursue relief for its
violations. 68 In Smith, parents of a disabled student brought a lawsuit to
recover attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,69 after prevailing on their
claim involving a financial dispute over the child's educational
placement. 70
The Court opined that because the IDEA was a
"comprehensive scheme" set up by Congress to assist the states in
providing a free, appropriate public education to students with disabilities,
allowing a plaintiff to circumvent IDEA's remedies would be inconsistent
with Congress's intent. 7 1 The Court reasoned that "it would also run
counter to Congress' view that the needs of handicapped children are best
accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency work
together to formulate an individualized plan for each handicapped child's
72
education."
The plaintiffs also asserted claims under § 1983, which the Court
rejected. 73 "We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude
reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim," the
Court offered. 74 "Since 1871, when it was passed by Congress, § 1983 has
stood as an independent safeguard against deprivations of federal
constitutional and statutory rights," it continued. 75 Nonetheless, the Court
held that where the IDEA applied, the only avenue through which it could
be enforced was the administrative remedies it provided.
63. See, e.g., Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir.
2001); see Bouchard, supra note 11, at 310.
64. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 310.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
66. Id. § 1988(b).
67. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
68. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). Section 1988(b) allows courts to award attorneys' fees
to the prevailing party in a lawsuit filed under § 1983.
70. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1000.
71. Id. at 1011-13.

72. Id. at 1012.
73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.
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The dissent in Smith argued that § 1983 was an appropriate means of
relief in IDEA cases. 76 The dissent reasoned that, in order to determine
whether § 1983 is available to claimants suing to enforce rights under the
IDEA, "each provision must be read together with the [IDEA]" so as to
preserve "those aspects of § ... 1983 that are not in irreconcilable conflict
with the [IDEA]. ' '77 The dissent noted that the Court failed to adhere to
"well-established principles of statutory interpretation" when it effectively
repealed § 1983 without finding support in the language or legislative
history of the IDEA. 7 8 Finally, the dissent suggested that Congress clarify
79
its position by revisiting the subject.
In 1986, Congress acted on the dissent's invitation and added § 1415()80
to the IDEA, which reads,
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or
other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,
except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking
relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under
subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same
extent as would
be required had the action been brought under this
subchapter. 81
Because the amendment expressly mentions the U.S. Constitution, Title
V of the Rehabilitation Act, and "other Federal laws protecting the rights of
children with disabilities," the provision overturned Smith's broad holding
that the IDEA provided the exclusive means through which a claimant's
82
wrongs could be remedied.
The amendment did not specifically mention § 1983. The legislative
history of the amendment, however, explicitly mentions § 1983.83
Therefore, the heart of the controversy lies in whether § 1415() effectively
overruled Smith's narrow holding that the IDEA is comprised of a
comprehensive remedial scheme that implicitly forecloses § 1983 relief.
Despite Congress's intent to clarify its position regarding the IDEA and
other laws, its silence since the passage of the 1986 amendment to the
IDEA has resulted in much perplexity among the courts, and a split among
84
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

76. See id. at 1030 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1023-24.

78. Id. at 1030.
79. Id. at 1031.
80. This provision was originally codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2000). This Note
refers to it at its present location in the U.S. Code, § 1415(o.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(/) (citations omitted).
82. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 321; Seligmann, supra note 17, at 492-93.
83. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 7 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1807, 1809. For a complete discussion of this legislative history, see infra Part III.A.
84. See Bouchard, supra note 11, at 322.
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While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the availability
of § 1983 for IDEA violations since Smith, it has addressed the scope of
rights under the IDEA. In Winkelman v. Parma City School District,8 5
decided in 2007, the Supreme Court held that parents have rights under the
IDEA, and are therefore entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own
behalf.86 The Court "disagree[d] that the sole purpose driving IDEA's
involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child's rights. It is
a recognized legal interest
not a novel proposition to say that parents have
'87
in the education and upbringing of their child."
The parents in Winkelman based their argument for enforceable rights
under the IDEA on a comprehensive reading of the Act, arguing that
"[t]aken as a whole,... the Act leads to the necessary conclusion that
parents have independent, enforceable rights."'88 The Supreme Court
agreed with their reasoning. 8 9 The Court referred to its discussion of
statutory interpretation in a 2006 case that considered the language of the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 90 In that case, Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, the
Court opined that "[tjhe definition of words in isolation . . . is not
necessarily controlling in statutory construction. . . . Interpretation of a
word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering
the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or
authorities that inform the analysis." 9 1 The Winkelman Court then engaged
in a comprehensive analysis of the IDEA's statutory scheme to reach its
92
conclusion.
The Supreme Court agreed that parents enjoy independent, enforceable
rights under the IDEA, and that it would be "inconsistent with the statutory
scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal
court."

93

II. ANALYZING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHETHER A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ACTION
CAN BE BROUGHT TO ENFORCE RIGHTS UNDER THE IDEA
A number of cases have presented courts with the question of whether to
allow a § 1983 action to proceed for the purpose of enforcing rights under
the IDEA. The courts' interpretations of the 1986 addition of § 1415(l) to
the IDEA vary: The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits have held that § 1983 cannot be used to remedy a
violation of the IDEA. 94 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007).
See id. at 2006.
Id. at 2003 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
Id. at 1999.
Id. at 2003.
Id. at 2000.
Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).
Winkelman, 127 S.Ct. at 2000-05.
Id. at 2002.
See, e.g., Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.

denied, 128 S. Ct. 1447 (2008); Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir.
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Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have allowed such suits to proceed. 95 The
Third Circuit previously had allowed § 1983 actions as an appropriate
remedy for an IDEA violation. 96 But, in 2007, the Third Circuit reversed
its prior holding, ruling instead that the 1986 amendment did not give
claimants a remedy under § 1983. 97 Part II.A examines the circuit court
decisions that have been favorable to allowing § 1983 to enforce rights
under the IDEA. Part II.B explores the circuit court decisions that have
precluded § 1983 relief under the IDEA. Finally, Part II.C focuses on the
Third Circuit's route to its recent reversal in Jersey City.
A. Decisions Favorableto Using § 1983
to Enforce Rights Under the IDEA
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that, with the 1986
amendment to the IDEA, Congress intended that IDEA rights be
enforceable under § 1983.98
1. Seventh Circuit: Marie 0. v. Edgar
In Marie 0. v. Edgar,9 9 four infants with disabilities brought an action on
behalf of themselves and 26,000 other children living in Illinois who were
not receiving early intervention services despite their eligibility. The
Seventh Circuit relied on § 1415(l) to reach the conclusion that § 1983 is an
available remedy for IDEA violations. The court held that, not only did
Congress not intend to foreclose resort to § 1983, "but it actually provided
for its availability to enforce the IDEA."' 100
The preschool-age children brought their suit under Part C of the
IDEA, 10 1 which sets up a federal program by which funds are allocated to
states to provide early intervention services to developmentally delayed
infants and toddlers from birth through age two. 102 In order to receive these
funds, a state must prove that it has set up a comprehensive system in which
2006); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000); Sellers v. Sch. Bd.
of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 532 (4th Cir. 1998).
95. See, e.g., Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 1997); Digre v. Roseville
Schs. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1988); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d
748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987).
96. See, e.g., A.W. v Jersey City Pub. Schs., 2005 WL 5740224, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 21,
2005); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir. 1995).
97. See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 806 (3d cir. 2007) (en banc).
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. But see Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d
1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 1983 actions are not available to enforce rights
under the IDEA, but failing to either mention or cite to Digre).
99. 131 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1997).
100. Id.at 622.
101. At the time this case was decided, the relevant portion of IDEA was referred to as
Part H. On June 4, 1997, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of
1997 were enacted. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487).
Part C's effective date was July 1, 1998. This Note refers to the relevant portion of the
IDEA as Part C, despite the case's reference to Part H.
102. Edgar, 131 F.3d at 612.
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The State of Illinois began
it implements these interventions. 10 3
participating in 1987 and received more than $34 million in federal funds
during the ten-year period between then and 1997, when this case was
decided. 10 4 However, despite receiving the funds, Illinois was not in full
compliance with the statute until 1996.105 In 1993, the Auditor General of
Illinois reviewed the state's progress and found that many children were not
waiting lists for early intervention
being served and instead were placed on
06
services, like the four infant plaintiffs. 1
The plaintiffs, as a class, sought declaratory and injunctive relief'0 7 under
§ 1983.108 In 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that plaintiffs had a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce
their rights under Part C of the IDEA. 10 9 The defendants, however,
continued to contest the holding, arguing that a § 1983 action to enforce
rights under the IDEA was barred."1 0
The defendants argued that Part C had not yet been enacted when the
IDEA was amended in 1986 to include § 1415(). However, the Seventh
Circuit held that "not only did Congress not intend to foreclose resort to §
1983 in Part [C], but it actually provided for its availability to enforce the
IDEA."' l The court reasoned that, "[a]s the parties agree, § 1415([1]) was
enacted for the express purpose of ensuring that § 1983 claims would be
available to enforce the IDEA." 112 The express language of the provision
referred to the entire Chapter 33 of Title 20 of the U.S. Code (the entire
to
IDEA, including Part C), so there was no need for Congress to refer
113
whether an action was permissible under § 1983 expressly in Part C.
2. Eighth Circuit: Digre v. Roseville Schools Independent DistrictNo. 623
Similarly, in Digre v. Roseville Schools Independent District No. 623,114
in which a parent brought a § 1983 damages action to enjoin the Roseville
School District from placing her son in a special education program
pending a determination of his proper educational status at a due process
hearing, the Eighth Circuit held that § 1983 was available to remedy both
constitutional and IDEA violations.
The plaintiff student, Sean Digre, a boy of above-average intelligence,
was reported to have exhibited behavioral problems in his sixth grade class,
and was referred to the school district's child study team for evaluation.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 611-12.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 614.
Seeid. at619.
Id. at 622.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 841 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1988).
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The team found that Digre was argumentative with peers and did not abide
by school rules and regulations. As a result, they suggested that changes be
made to his educational program. 1 5 Reluctantly, the child's mother,
Sharon Digre, consented to special education in May 1985.'16 By mid1986, it was clear that her son was not responding well to his program,
which required him to spend half of each day in specialized classes.11 7 The
school district's team agreed to place him in regular education classes when
he returned to eighth grade in the fall. 118
Instead of returning to his school district the following year, Digre
moved with his father and enrolled in a different district, where he was
placed in regular education. When he moved back with his mother one
month later, she attempted to reenroll her son in mainstream education, but
19
the school asserted its right to continue his special education program."
Although the district offered to reevaluate Digre, his mother refused to
consent. She filed a lawsuit to preliminarily enjoin the school district from
placing her son in special education, claiming protection under the stay-put
provision of the IDEA. 120
Digre did not return to public school. 12 1 While the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota held that plaintiffs could not recover under §
1983, the Eighth Circuit held that the amended § 1415() of the IDEA
superseded the Supreme Court's holding in Smith. 122 Thus, the plaintiff
was entitled to bring a § 1983 action based on violations of the IDEA. 123
3. Second Circuit: Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi
The Second Circuit also has allowed § 1983 claims to enforce rights
under the IDEA to proceed, 124 finding that Congress so intended. 125
In 1987, in Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, the Second Circuit found that § 1983 was
available for a violation of the IDEA. 12 6 At the time the action was
commenced, Diedre W. was a minor with emotional, intellectual, and gross
motor disabilities. Nathan B. was also a minor at the time, diagnosed with
autism and mental retardation. In 1985, the parents of the disabled youth,
along with Connecticut Legal Services, brought a proceeding on their own
behalf and on the behalf of other disabled youth against the Connecticut
115. Id. at 248.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id.
120. Id. The stay-put provision of the IDEA requires that unless the state or local
educational agency and the parent or guardian otherwise agree, the child will remain in the
then-current educational placement while proceedings under the provision are pending. Id.
121. Id. at 249.
122. Id. at 249-50.
123. Id. at 250.
124. See, e.g., Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987).
125. Id.

126. Id.
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State Board of Education, its members, and the Connecticut Commissioner
of Education. 12 7 Their complaint alleged that the school districts violated
the IDEA 128 by failing to provide an adequate psychologist, and failing to
conduct triennial evaluations of the disabled children. 129 The board
responded that both Diedre and Nathan had been evaluated in excess of the
special education regulations under the IDEA, and furthermore, that
evaluations by school psychologists are not mandated under the
requirements of the statute. 130 The plaintiffs asserted that the board's
response failed to comply with the complaint resolution procedure because
the board did not communicate with the parents during the investigation,
nor did it provide them with an opportunity to present relevant
information.131 The parents also argued that they had not been afforded an
opportunity to raise their complaints in a due process hearing under §
1415(b)(2) of the IDEA.
In 1982, Connecticut Legal Services filed a separate complaint with the
board on behalf of Dale V. and all other disabled youth in the same school,
raising several IDEA violations. 132
As a result of the perceived
inadequacies of Connecticut's treatment of their complaints, the plaintiffs
commenced a § 1983 action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 133 The defendant
school board asserted that the plaintiffs had no private right of action under
§ 1983.134 Opining that the IDEA is a "comprehensive remedial statute,"
the district court held that "no private right of action lies against
35
defendants."1
However, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that § 1983 could be used
as a remedy for IDEA violations. 136 In a hearty discussion of the
availability of § 1983 federal jurisdiction to enforce federal statutory
violations, the court held that "[i]n light of [the 1986 amendment's] clear
legislative history ... parents are entitled to bring a § 1983 action based on
alleged violations of the [IDEA] or the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the federal Constitution."' 137 Citing a host of cases and
conducting a thorough examination of the House and Senate reports, the
court reasoned that the 1986 amendment, by enacting a nonexclusivity
provision, "expressly overruled Smith" by "codiflying] a congressional

127. Id. at 752.
128. At the time of this proceeding, the State of Connecticut received federal funds for
enacting legislation that implements the IDEA's requirements. Id. at 751.
129. Id. at 752.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 752-53.
133. Id. at 753.
134. Id.
135. Id.

136. Id. at 755.
137. Id.
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purpose long in place which Congress believed the Supreme Court had
'138
misinterpreted.'
In 2002, fifteen years after Tirozzi, the Second Circuit in Weixel v. Board
of Education of New York 1 3 9 reinstated the plaintiff s § 1983 claim because
she stated causes of action under the IDEA, 140 indicating that Tirozzi was
still very much alive in the Second Circuit.
B. Decisions Unfavorable to Using § 1983
to Enforce Rights Under the IDEA
The First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all have held that §
1983 cannot be used to enforce rights conferred by the IDEA. 14 1 Generally,
the circuit courts have reached holdings barring § 1983 claims by relying on
the Supreme Court's decision in Smith and rejecting the notion42 that
Congress's subsequent amendment opened the door to § 1983 claims.1
1. First Circuit: Diaz-Fonsecav. Puerto Rico
In 2006, in Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 143 the First Circuit held that a
parent could not use § 1983 to bypass the IDEA's remedial structure. 144
Citing circuit precedent in Nieves-Mfirquez v. Puerto Rico, 14 5 the court
reasoned that, "'if federal policy precludes money damages for IDEA
claims, it would be odd for damages to be available under another
' 46
vehicle.., where the underlying claim is one of violation of IDEA."" 1
The court further explained that allowing the plaintiffs to claim money
damages under § 1983 "'would subvert.., the overall scheme that
Congress envisioned for dealing with educational disabilities,"' 147 and
is to provide a free,
would undermine the purpose of the IDEA, 14which
8
youth.
disabled
to
education
public
appropriate
The court's analysis of the caveat set out in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) was that
Congress, in amending the IDEA, intended to ensure that the IDEA did not
138. Id. at 754-55.
139. 287 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2002).
140. Id. at 151. In a pro se pleading of startling facts, Rose Weixel contended that she
was denied a free, appropriate, public education when the school prevented her from taking
advanced math and science classes due to her chronic absences from school as a result of her
chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia. Id. at 142-45.
141. See Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1447 (2008).
142. See, e.g., id.; A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 797-99 (3d Cir. 2007)
(en banc).
143. 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006).
144. Id. at 28.
145. 353 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the only monetary awards available under
the IDEA are "[a]wards of compensatory education and equitable remedies that involve the
payment of money, such as reimbursements to parents for expenses incurred on private
educational services to which their child was later found to have been entitled").
146. Diaz-Fonseca,451 F.3d at 28 (quoting Nieves-Mdrquez, 353 F.3d at 125).
147. Id. at 29 (quoting Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 63 (1st Cir. 2002)).
148. Id. (citing Nieves-Mdrquez, 353 F.3d at 125).
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restrict rights and remedies "that were already independently available
through other sources of law." 14 9 Because the plaintiffs' case turned
entirely on the statutory rights guaranteed by the IDEA, the court concluded
structure in the statute
that the plaintiffs could not circumvent the remedial
150
by suing under § 1983 to enforce those rights.
2. Fourth Circuit: Sellers v. School Board of Manassas, Virginia
Similarly, in Sellers v. School Board of Manassas, Virginia,' 51 the Fourth
Circuit held that the 1986 amendment to the IDEA "reveal[ed] no intent
that parties be able to bypass the remedies provided in [the] IDEA by suing
instead under section 1983 for an IDEA violation," 152 reasoning that the
purpose of the IDEA's procedural mechanisms was to restore education
rights-not to53 "provide a forum for tort-like claims of educational
malpractice."1
In Sellers, the school system failed to diagnose Kristopher Sellers's
learning and emotional disabilities for many years. 154 In fact, he was a high
school student when he was finally classified as entitled to special
education services1 55 His lawsuit stated that his test scores "should have
alerted" the defendant school board of the need to evaluate Sellers much
earlier.156 Sellers finally began receiving special education services after an
IDEA administrative hearing, but a hearing officer determined that he was
157
unable to award compensatory and punitive damages to the Sellers.
After review by a state-level officer who reached the same conclusion, the
Sellers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations
of the IDEA. 158 The Sellers claimed that the defendant school board
neglected its duty to identify and evaluate the child after being alerted to his
condition by his fourth-grade test scores. 159 They also claimed that he had
not been provided with a free, appropriate public education because he did
not receive any special education services until the 1995 to 1996 school
year, when he was in high school. 160 As a result of these continued
violations of the IDEA, the Sellers claimed they were entitled to monetary
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In holding that the Sellers could not seek monetary damages under §
1983, the Fourth Circuit first discussed the Supreme Court's decision in
149. Id.
150. See id. at 28-29.
151. 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998).

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 530.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 525.
See id.

156. Id.
157. See id. at 526.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 525.
160. Id. at 526.
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Smith, concluding that the IDEA is the exclusive avenue through which a
disabled child and her aggrieved parents can pursue their claim. 16 1 In
response to the Sellers' argument that the 1986 amendment to the IDEA
that was enacted as a result of Smith "demonstrate[d] a clear congressional
intent that plaintiffs once again be permitted to sue under section 1983 for
IDEA violations," the court opined that no such intent existed upon a closer
reading of the provision because "it simply fails to mention section
1983.' 16 2 Notwithstanding its concession that the amendment preserved
the right of plaintiffs to bring a § 1983 action for constitutional violations,
the court made clear that the amendment does not permit plaintiffs to sue
163
under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA, which are "statutory in nature."
Moreover, it clarified that nothing in § 1415(l) effectively overruled
Smith. 164
Because a higher standard of liability-a showing of purposeful
discrimination-is required to prevail on a constitutional equal protection
claim as opposed to a violation of the IDEA (which is achieved by simply
showing a failure to provide a free, appropriate public education), the court
felt vindicated in its interpretation. 165 Therefore, the court reasoned,
because the Supreme Court has not classified education as a fundamental
right, 166 and because it has not yet classified disabled persons as a suspect
class, 16 7 "a plaintiff in this context would have to prove that a school
board's decision was without any rational basis,"' 168 and it is therefore easy
to see why Congress would intend to subject school districts to more severe
penalties under § 1983 "for their more culpable constitutional failures, yet
not for breaches of [the] IDEA."' 69 And despite the Sellers' argument that
the legislative history of § 1415(l) revealed Congress's explicit intent to
permit disabled children to pursue IDEA violations via § 1983, the court
found that a closer look uncovers Congress's intent to restore constitutional
rights under the IDEA to plaintiffs. 170 Moreover, because the IDEA was
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, the court opined, § 1415(l) must
be subject to the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman:17 1 "'[I]f Congress desires to condition
the States' receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambiguously .... "'172
161. Id. at 529-30.
162. Id. at 530.
163. Id. (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 530-31.
166. Id. at 531 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37
(1973)).
167. Id. (citing City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46
(1985)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 530-31.
171. 451 U.S. 1, 17(1981).

172. Sellers, 141 F.3d at 532 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Therefore, if Congress intended plaintiffs to be able to sue under
§ 1983 for
173
violations of the IDEA, it would have had to say it with clarity.
3. Tenth Circuit: Padillav. School DistrictNo. 1
In Padilla v. School District No. 1,174 the Tenth Circuit agreed with the
reasoning in Sellers that 175
the amendment to the IDEA "may not provide the
basis for § 1983 claims."
In Padilla,the plaintiff, a physically and developmentally disabled child,
asserted that she was denied the behavioral programming, augmentative
communication, and tube feeding services that were identified in her IEP by
the Denver school district. 176 She further argued that she was subjected to a
"windowless closet, restrained in a stroller without supervision" by the
defendants, and that on one of these occasions, she "tipped over and hit her
head on the floor, suffering serious physical injuries, including a skull
fracture and exacerbation of a seizure disorder," which caused her to miss
school for the rest of the year.' 77 During that year, the plaintiff did not
receive homeschooling, further denying her a free, appropriate public
education. 178 After moving to a different school district in August 1997,
the student requested an administrative hearing in February 1998.179 After
her request was denied by the hearing officer because she lived outside of
the district, she filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado alleging under § 1983 that the school district had violated her
rights under the IDEA by denying her a free, appropriate public education,
and specifically seeking monetary damages. 180 The district court dismissed
but
the plaintiffs § 1983 claim as to one of the individual defendants,
8
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in all other respects.' '
In this case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the district
court's decision was flawed because it presupposed that § 1983 monetary
damages were available under the IDEA, primarily relying on the decisions
of other circuit courts. 182 Agreeing with the Fourth Circuit in Sellers, the
court here supported its position that monetary damages under § 1983 were
not available to plaintiffs to enforce rights under the IDEA using post-Smith
Supreme Court precedent. 183 According to the court, Wright v. City of

173. See id. at 532.
174. 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000).
175. Id. at 1273.
176. Id. at 1271.
177. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1272.
183. Id. at 1273. The court refers to two cases decided after the enactment of§ 1415(/) in
which the Supreme Court cited Smith "as an example of an exhaustive legislative
enforcement scheme that precludes § 1983 causes of action." Id. These cases are Blessing v.
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Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority acknowledged that Congress
intended to preclude § 1983 remedies to enforce IDEA violations because
of the independent judicial remedies written into the statute, 184 and Blessing
v. Freestone discussed Smith as "one of only two cases in which it had
'found a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant §
1983.'"185 The court ultimately shared the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
did not effectively overrule Smith, as
the 1986 amendment to the IDEA
186
evidenced by these two cases.
4. Ninth Circuit: Blanchardv. Morton School District
In September 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued a very brief opinion in which
it held that the "comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA evidences
Congress's intent to preclude a § 1983 claim for the violation of rights
under the IDEA."' 187 But the recent Ninth Circuit case varied somewhat
from the typical IDEA § 1983 claim, in that a parent sued for emotional
distress and lost income experienced during the time she was petitioning the
school district for special services under the IDEA for her autistic son.
Previously, the Ninth Circuit had held that, because the parent had brought
suit on her own behalf rather than on behalf of her minor son, no
administrative remedies existed. The U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington held on remand that Cheryl Blanchard had no
individual rights under the IDEA. 188 However, in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Winkelman, 189 which held that parents have
individually enforceable rights under the IDEA,190 the circuit court reversed
the district court's finding that parents did not have individually enforceable
rights under the IDEA, 19 1 but held that the IDEA "does not contemplate the
remedy Blanchard seeks and in that regard creates no right enforceable
under § 1983."192 The Ninth Circuit referred to the "thoughtful, wellreasoned opinion of the Third Circuit" earlier that year in its simple
193
statement rejecting the use of § 1983 to enforce rights under the IDEA.
194
No further analysis, reasoning, or precedent was offered by the court.

Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), and Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1986).
184. Id. (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 427).
185. Id. at 1273-74 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347).
186. Id.

187. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 1447 (2008).
188. See id. at 936 (citing Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.
2005)).
189. 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007) (holding that parents enjoy rights under the IDEA and are

entitled to bring IDEA claims on their own behalf).
190. Id. at 1999.
191. Blanchard,509 F.3d at 936.

192. Id. at 938.
193. Id. at 937.
194. See id. at 937-38.
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C. The Third Circuit'sRoute
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Third Circuit's en banc ruling in Jersey
City195 that a § 1983 action may not be brought against public school
officials to enforce rights under the IDEA. 196 However, what was unusual
97
about the Third Circuit's decision was that it reversed its own precedent. 1
Previously, the Third Circuit held in W.B. v. Matula' 98 that § 1983 was an
appropriate avenue of relief for IDEA violations.' 99 But the court rejected
the Matula rule twelve years after its inception.
1. The Original Rule: Matula
In 1995, the Third Circuit held that a § 1983 damages action may be
20 0
brought against public school officials to enforce rights under the IDEA.
In its ruling, the court opined that "there is strong suggestion" that Congress
did not intend to preclude such relief when it enacted the IDEA, citing its
prior holding in Board of Education v. Diamond,20 1 the "plain language of §
202
1983," and the text and history of the IDEA.
After moving to Hackettstown, New Jersey, in the summer of 1991, and
before the start of school, the plaintiff parent, identified as W.B., met with
the defendant, the principal of the elementary school, to discuss her child
E.J.'s behavioral problems. 20 3 E.J. was placed in the codefendant teacher's
first-grade class in September 1991. Shortly thereafter, the teacher reported
that E.J. exhibited a "variety of disruptive behaviors," including fighting
with other students, and making continuous noises. 204 She also reported
that E.J. frequently urinated and defecated in his pants, and that the other
children were teasing him as a result. 20 5 At this time, the teacher informed
W.B. that E.J. exhibited symptoms of Attention Deficit Disorder/Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).2 0 6 In October, W.B. met with the
teacher, the chief school administrator, and the person responsible for
compliance with the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act regarding
her son's behavioral and academic problems. 20 7 None of the school

195. 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that a § 1983 action was not
available to enforce rights under the IDEA).
196. Blanchard,509 F.3d at 937-38.
197. See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 792-93.
198. 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 495.
200. Id.
201. 808 F.2d 987 (3d. Cir. 1986) (holding that parents were not precluded from seeking
compensatory damages).
202. Matula, 67 F.3d at 495.
203. Id. at 488.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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or discussed the entitlement of
officials referred E.J. for an evaluation
20 8
special education services with W.B.

E.J. was diagnosed with ADHD later in the fall of 1991 by a private
therapist. 20 9 However, because school officials believed that ADHD did
not qualify a child for special education services under the IDEA or § 504,
the school refused W.B.'s initial request for evaluation. 2 10 The school
ultimately relented and approved W.B.'s request after W.B. presented the
director of the Mansfield Child Study Team with a memorandum from the
Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
indicating that ADHD was indeed a qualifying condition. 2 11 Finally, in
April 1992, the school concluded that E.J. was entitled to special education
services under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.2 12 However, despite this
finding, the school did not begin providing such services. 2 13 Rather, school
W.B.'s request that the school fund an independent
officials refused
2 14
evaluation.
As a result, W.B. brought her first IDEA administrative proceeding
before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law to demand an
independent evaluation, an IEP, a classification of E.J. as "neurologically
impaired," costs, and fees. 2 15 The independent evaluation was performed in
July. In addition to ADHD, E.J. was diagnosed with Tourette's syndrome
and a severe form of obsessive-compulsive disorder, confirming W.B.'s
suspicions that school officials had not correctly identified her son's
21 6
problems.
Despite the diagnosis and his continuing problems, E.J. did not receive
special education services in the following year.2 17 The school continued to
refuse to classify E.J. as neurologically impaired, finding that instead he
was "perceptually impaired"-a significant distinction because that meant
E.J. qualified for a lower level of services. 218 In April 1993, after nearly ten
days of hearings, W.B. and the board settled. W.B. finally prevailed on her
request for classification of her son as neurologically impaired, and the
development of an IEP-but not without an "enormously burdensome
struggle," the court noted. 2 19 W.B. commenced a proceeding in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey in July 1993, naming nine
defendants in their personal and official capacities, alleging causes of action
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 489.

212. The Mansfield Child Study Team found that because E.J.'s academic performance
was on or above grade level, he was not entitled to special education services under the
IDEA. Id.
213. Matula, 67 F.3d at 489.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 490.
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under § 1983 for violation of the IDEA and seeking compensatory and
punitive damages for denying her son a free, appropriate public
education. 220 The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, finding that the administrative hearing
"unambiguously provide[ed] for the full resolution of the dispute between
222
the parties." 22 1 W.B. appealed to the Third Circuit.
Citing to Senate 22 3 and House reports, 224 the Third Circuit reasoned that
in enacting § 1415() of the IDEA, "Congress specifically intended that
[IDEA) violations could be redressed by § 504 and § 1983 actions," finding
that § 1983 supplied a private right of action in the case. 22 5 Regarding the
availability of damages, the court first examined the legislative history and
the text of § 1983 and the IDEA, opining that "nothing in the text or history
[of IDEA] suggest[s] that relief under IDEA is limited in any way." 226 The
court discussed the split among the circuit courts involving this issue, and
citing its precedent in Diamond, concluded that a disabled child could not
be precluded from seeking monetary damages in such an action. It
cautioned, however, that a district court considering such a remedy may do
education rather than monetary damages
better in awarding compensatory
227
suffering.
and
pain
for
2. The Reversal: Jersey City
In a similarly grounded lawsuit, A.W., a New Jersey public school
student with dyslexia, enrolled as a second-grade student in the Jersey City
Public Schools in September 1988 and allegedly made little progress in
reading, writing, and spelling until May 2000.228 Because his learning
disability was never diagnosed by the school system, A.W. did not receive
special education services from September 1988 to May 2000, despite the
time, however, the
fact that he was eligible under the IDEA. 229 During that
230
school district received federal funds under the IDEA.
Twelve years after he first enrolled in the Jersey City Public School
District, A.W. was still unable to read, write, and spell, as a twenty-year-old
tenth grader. 23 1 In January 2000, he finally obtained an independent

220. Id. at 490-91.
221. Id. at 491 (citation omitted).
222. See id.
223. S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 1 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799.
224. H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 7 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1807, 1809.
225. Matula, 67 F.3d at 494.

226. Id.
227. Id. at 495.
228. A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sobs., No. 01-CV-140 (WGB), 2002 WL 1065685, at *2
(D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2002).

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.

3086

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

educational evaluation and was diagnosed with dyslexia. 232 The school
district, in response, created an IEP for him, which included special
education services in the areas of reading, writing, and spelling
23 3
instruction.
Three years before A.W. began receiving special educational services,
A.W.'s grandmother (his legal guardian at the time) had filed a complaint
with the NJDOE on behalf of A.W. and others similarly situated. 2 34 It was
through this complaint that the NJDOE and its employees first learned of
A.W.'s case. 2 35 The department conducted an investigation and issued a
report in June 1998, finding that the school district was out of compliance
that its reading
with the IDEA because it was unable to demonstrate2 36
curricula could be adapted for students with special needs.
Despite the NJDOE's finding of the district's noncompliance, A.W. was
not awarded relief.237 As a result, he asserted in the federal lawsuit that the
NJDOE "knew or reasonably should have known of his dyslexia, and
should have known that an educational program effective at remediating his
condition should have been implemented. '238 The New Jersey district
court, relying on Matula, found that the plaintiff had put forth a valid §
1983 claim and should be given the opportunity to substantiate it through
discovery. 239 In 2005, the district court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment in respect to the § 1983 claims, finding that the IDEA
could be enforced through § 1983 based on Matula.240
However, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedent
in Matula and reversed the court below, holding that "A.W. [did] not
allege[] an actionable violation of his rights under the IDEA."'24 1 To reach
that conclusion, the court reexamined Congress's intent when it amended
the IDEA in 1986 to include § 1415(l), revisiting the legislative history it
reviewed in Matula, the current split among the circuit courts regarding this
question, and the 2005 Supreme Court decision in City of Rancho Palos
242
Verdes v. Abrams.
The court acknowledged that, in Matula, it had interpreted Congress's
enactment of § 1415(l) in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith as "mak[ing] clear that actions can be maintained under the
Constitution or under federal laws protecting the rights of children with
disabilities notwithstanding the fact that the IDEA also protects these
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at *8-9.
240. A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., No. 01-CV-140, 2005 WL 5740224, at *7 (D.N.J.
Apr. 21, 2005).
241. A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 806 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
242. See id. at 796-803.
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rights." 243 While noting that it "[was] not alone in this view at the time,"
the en banc court explained that, following Matula, "reasonable minds have
differed as to the correctness of [its] interpretation
of the congressional
44
reaction to [Smith] embodied in § 1415(o."2
The court adopted the reasoning of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in
Sellers245 and Padilla246 that the provision at issue does not refer to § 1983,
but rather references substantive rights. 24 7 In Sellers, the Jersey City court
explained, the Fourth Circuit determined that the relevant language in the
amended provision-"other statutes protecting the rights of disabled
children"-could not refer to § 1983 because it does not refer specifically to
"disability nor youth" but instead "speaks generally." 248 The Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history also differed greatly from
the Third Circuit's previous interpretation in Matula in its conclusion that
the House report's express reference to § 1983 only intended that disabled
youth and their parents utilize the statute to redress constitutional violations
under the IDEA. 249 The court further explained that the Tenth Circuit, in
Padilla,agreed with the Fourth Circuit in its reasoning, and cited two post1986 amendment Supreme Court decisions, Blessing2 50 and Wright,25 1 that
referenced the IDEA as a comprehensive remedial scheme that precludes a
§ 1983 remedy. 2 52 These analyses, the court reasoned, coupled with the
Supreme Court's discussion of the use of § 1983 to redress violations of
federal statutory
rights in Rancho Palos Verdes, "tipped the scales...
'2 53
definitively.
The Third Circuit relied heavily on Rancho Palos Verdes2 54 to reach its
conclusion that § 1983 is not available to plaintiffs seeking to enforce rights
under the IDEA. The Court, in Rancho Palos Verdes, examined the
2 55
intersection of § 1983 damages and the Telecommunications Act (TCA)
in the context of an amateur radio operator who was denied a "conditional243. Id. at 796.
244. Id. at 797.
245. 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998) (precluding § 1983 actions for statutory violations of
the IDEA).
246. 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that, as a matter of first impression, § 1983
actions are precluded to enforce rights under the IDEA).
247. See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 797-98.
248. Id. at 798 (citing Sellers, 141 F.3d at 530).
249. See id.
250. For a discussion of Blessing, see supra note 57.
251. For a discussion of Wright, see supra note 56.
252. Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 798-99.
253. Id. at 799.
254. 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (holding that § 1983 may not be used to enforce federal
statutory limitations on local zoning authority).
255. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 seeks to promote competition and produce
higher quality telecommunication services. The Act largely imposes limitations on local and
state governments to regulate the location, construction, and modification of these facilities.
Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 115-16. The Act provides for a judicial remedy in the
case that its provisions are violated by a State or local government, or "any instrumentality
thereof" 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (2000).
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use permit" to build a radio tower on his property.2 56 The radio operator
alleged that the denial of the use permit violated several provisions of the
TCA, and he therefore sought injunctive relief under the Act as well as
money damages and attorneys' fees under §§ 1983 and 1988.257
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court reiterated that a plaintiff must first
establish that the "federal statute creates an individually enforceable
right, '2 58 and that this demonstration creates "a rebuttable presumption that
the right is enforceable under § 1983."259 However, a "defendant may
defeat this presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend that
remedy for a newly created right. '2 60 The Court deduced, in a statement
that would heavily influence the en banc Third Circuit, that "evidence of
such congressional intent may be found directly in the statute creating the
right, or inferred from the statute's creation of a 'comprehensive
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
crucial consideration,"' the Court noted, "'is what
§ 1983."'26 1 "'The 262
Congress intended.'
Because the parties conceded that the telecommunications statute at issue
conferred an individually enforceable right, the case turned on whether
Congress intended the judicial remedy provided for in the TCA to coexist
with an alternative remedy available under § 1983.263 Despite the Court's
conclusion that it did not, 264 the Court expressly refused to hold (despite the
urging of the federal government and the City of Rancho Palos Verdes as
amici) that the "availability of a private judicial remedy... conclusively
establishes[] a congressional intent to preclude § 1983 relief." 265 Instead,
the Court drew a distinction between "merely indicative of" and
"conclusively establishes" in reference to this analysis, noting that "[t]he
ordinary inference that the remedy provided in the statute is exclusive can
256. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 116-18.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See id. at 117-18.
Id. at 120 (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002)).
Id. (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)).
Id. (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)).
Id. (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341).
Id. (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012).

263. See id.

264. The Court reached its narrow holding that the TCA precluded § 1983 relief by
eliciting congressional intent from a textual comparison of the statute of limitations for a
TCA claim and a § 1983 claim. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion joined
by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that praised
the Court for "wisely reject[ing] the Government's proposed rule that the availability of a
private judicial remedy conclusively establishes .

. .

a congressional intent to preclude ... §

1983 relief." See id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in a separate opinion in order to call attention to "[t]wo
concurring). In addition to his belief
flaws in the Court's approach." Id. at 130 (Stevens, J.,
that the Court did not diligently recognize the "strength of [the Court's] normal presumption
that Congress intended to preserve, rather than preclude, the availability of § 1983 as a
remedy for the enforcement of federal statutory rights," he bluntly stated that "the Court
incorrectly assumes that the legislative history of the statute is totally irrelevant." Id. at 13031.

265. Id. at 122.
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surely be overcome by textual indication, express or implicit, that the
remedy is to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983."266
Despite the Supreme Court's refusal in Rancho Palos Verdes to hold that
the presence of a private judicial remedy within a statute "conclusively
establishes" a congressional intent to preclude § 1983 relief, the en banc
Third Circuit in Jersey City, without citing any authority, interpreted
with
Rancho Palos Verdes to have "upended the Blessing 'presumption,'
267
the inclusion of a private remedy being the pivotal factor."
III.

DEFENDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF

IDEA RIGHTS

UNDER §

1983

As evidenced by the text, structure, and legislative history of the 1986
amendment to the IDEA, not only did Congress not intend to foreclose
avenues to § 1983, it actually called for its availability to enforce the
IDEA. 268

In holding otherwise, courts have failed to consider the

legislative history as well as the need for a deterrent to violations of the
IDEA. While the Third Circuit recently ruled that § 1983 actions were not
available to enforce the IDEA, 269 a holding which the Ninth Circuit
subsequently found persuasive, such holdings should not carry weight
because the Third Circuit misinterpreted the Court's holding in Rancho
Palos Verdes. A close reading of Rancho Palos Verdes reveals that the
Supreme Court expressly left open the possibility of § 1983 damages
actions to enforce IDEA violations, contrary to the Third Circuit's analysis.
Rather, the conclusion that § 1983 damages actions should be available to
claimants who seek to enforce rights under the IDEA flows naturally from
the Supreme Court's 2007 holding in Winkelman that both parents and their
disabled youth enjoy individual, substantive, enforceable rights under the
IDEA. 2 70 Finally, a host of policy considerations, such as deterrence,
school disincentives for complying with the IDEA, and the disproportionate
number of disabled youths who are left denied-sometimes for years-also
support this conclusion.

A. The Legislative History of§ 1415(l)
By enacting § 1415(),271 Congress specifically intended that IDEA
violations could be redressed by § 1983 actions, as revealed by the
legislative history of the amendment. 272 The amendment clearly was
passed to correct Smith's erroneous construction of the original
congressional intent, 273 and a number of courts have recognized-and

266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
See.A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 801 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
See supra notes 80-83, 111-12, 136-38, 223-26 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.2.

270. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 80-83, 111-12, 136-38, 223-26 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part I.C.
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continue4 to recognize-that the 1986 amendment effectively overruled
27
Smith.
The Senate report includes a lengthy discussion of Smith, and favorably
discusses the dissenting opinion, including its plea for "Congress ... to take
the time to revisit the matter." 2 75 The House conference report explicitly
states, "[i]t is the conferees' intent that actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
1983 are governed by this provision." 2 76 Additionally, as the Matula court
notes, the House report explicitly states that "[c]ongresional intent was
ignored by the U.S. Supreme Court when ... it handed down its decision in
[Smith]," and further adds that "since 1978, it has been Congress' intent to
permit parents or guardians to pursue the rights of handicapped children
through [IDEA], section 504, and section 1983."277 Thus, § 1415(l) was
enacted to "reaffirm, in light of [Smith], the viability of section 504, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and other statutes as separate vehicles for ensuring the rights
of handicapped children." 278 Far from precluding a § 1983 action
predicated on the IDEA, the 1986 amendment explicitly offered its approval
for such actions. Therefore, despite the fact that the text of the amendment
does not include a specific mention of § 1983, such actions are appropriate
27 9
under the IDEA.
2
80
In Tirozzi,
the Second Circuit relied on the legislative history of §
1415(l) to reach its conclusion that a § 1983 action is available to remedy
violations of the IDEA. 28 1 The court explained that Congress's aim in
to allow resort to other judicial
amending the IDEA after Smith was 282
remedies for claims based on the IDEA.
Finally, the Third Circuit initially agreed, in Matula, that the legislative
history of § 1415(l) confirmed Congress's intent to allow § 1983 monetary
damages actions to proceed under the IDEA. 283 Not until Jersey City, in
which the court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Rancho Palos
Verdes, did the Third Circuit find that § 1983 damages actions were
precluded under the IDEA.2 84 However, the en banc reversal of the Third
Circuit's former precedent is problematic.
B. The Third Circuit'sReliance on Rancho Palos Verdes
In reversing its holding in Matula, which found a remedy for IDEA
violation under § 1983, the Third Circuit in Jersey City relied heavily on the
274. See supra notes 111-12, 136-38, 223-26 and accompanying text.
275. S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 2 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799.
276. H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 7 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1807, 1809.
277. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 4 (1985)).
278. Id.
279. See supra notes 80-83, 111-12, 136-38, 223-26 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part II.A.3.
281. See supra Part II.A.3.
282. See supra Part II.A.3.
283. See supra Part II.C. 1.
284. See supra Part II.C.2.
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Supreme Court's decision in Rancho Palos Verdes. However, that case
dealt not with the IDEA, but rather with the Telecommunications Act of
1996.285 Therefore, the Rancho Palos Verdes case did not examine the
relationship between the IDEA and § 1983.
In Jersey City, the Third Circuit claimed that, in finding a right to § 1983
damages in Matula, it had erroneously relied on Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, a case that "was not a § 1983 case at all; rather, it
focused on whether damages could be recovered in an action to enforce
Title IX."' 286 Yet the Third Circuit gave the Rancho Palos Verdes decision
considerable weight, despite the fact that the case did not involve the IDEA
at all. Instead, Rancho Palos Verdes focused on whether an amateur radio
operator who sought to provide wireless service to his community could
recover damages in an action based on the TCA. 28 7 As Justice Stephen G.
Breyer remarked in his concurring opinion in Rancho Palos Verdes, "[t]he
statute books are too many, federal laws too diverse, and their purposes288too
complex for any legal formula to provide more than general guidance."
In placing so much emphasis on Rancho Palos Verdes, the Third Circuit
cursorily rejected arguments that the legislative history, as interpreted by its
sister courts-and that very court in Matula-revealed congressional intent
that § 1983 was available to claimants seeking to enforce rights under the
IDEA. 289 Relegated to a footnote, the Jersey City court peremptorily noted
the Supreme Court's failure to survey the legislative history of the federal
statute at issue. 290 In a brief statement, the court quoted Justice John Paul
Stevens's disagreement with the Court's analysis-"that the Court assumed
'that the legislative history of the statute is totally irrelevant.' ' 29 1
Curiously, what the Third Circuit omitted from its terse summary of Justice
Stevens's opinion was the word "incorrectly." 292 In actuality, his statement
assumes that the legislative history of the
reads: "[T]he Court incorrectly
'29 3
irrelevant.
totally
is
statute
In fact, a close reading of Justice Stevens's concurrence reveals that,
although in agreement with the Court in the narrow result of its holding
(that an individual may not enforce the TCA's limitations on local zoning
authority through a § 1983 action), Justice Stevens was concurring in the
majority's holding-that a defendant may defeat the presumption that a
right is enforceable under § 1983 by a showing that Congress did not intend
that remedy for a newly created right. Justice Stevens devoted nearly his
285. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
286. A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 799 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc); see
supra Part II.C.2.
287. See supra Part II.C.2.
288. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
289. See supra Part II.C.2.
290. See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 803 n.14.
291. Id. (noting Justice Stevens's concurrence in Rancho Palos Verdes).
292. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 131 (Stevens, J., concurring).
293. Id.
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entire opinion to two notions: first, that the Court had not properly
acknowledged the strength of the Supreme Court's normal presumption that
Congress intended § 1983 to preserve rather than preclude remedies for the
enforcement of federal statutory rights; and second, that the surveying of
legislative history has been a necessary component of statutory
Supreme Court for "nearly every case [it
interpretation employed by the 294
has] decided in this area of law."
Furthermore, in a separate concurring opinion, Justice Breyer also
discussed the importance of "context, not just literal text" when conducting
statutory analysis to determine congressional intent. 295 Justice Breyer
examined both House and Senate reports and concluded that permitting §
to prevail under the TCA would undermine principles of
1983 actions
296
federalism.
When examining the IDEA, the Supreme Court's holding in Winkelman
(the case giving parents enforceable rights under the IDEA) suggests the
application of this principle to § 1983 claims relating to the IDEA. Just as
the petitioners in the various cases discussed above had not been able to cite
to a specific clause in § 1415(l) that expressly allows § 1983 damages suits
predicated on the IDEA, the petitioners in Winkelman were unable to cite to
any specific provision of the IDEA to support their argument. 297 Therefore,
2 98
the Supreme Court looked to a "comprehensive reading" of the statute.
Allowing § 1983 actions to prevail under the IDEA is a natural extension of
the Court's holding, as it is a well-established principle that a "party
aggrieved" is, by definition, entitled to a remedy. 299 Both Winkelman and
Rancho Palos Verdes indicate that the Court is leaning toward preserving §
1983 rather than precluding it.
C. Policy Arguments Supporting the Availability
of§ 1983 Actions Under the IDEA
School districts are likely to be encouraged to comply with the IDEA if30 §
0
1983 actions (notably for monetary damages) are available to claimants.
Those courts that have found otherwise have made decisions based on
"their own notions of sound public policy" as opposed to congressional
intent at the time the 1986 amendment was passed. 30 1 The disincentives for
294. See id.

295. Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).
296. See id. at 128.
297. See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 1999 (2007).
298. See id. at 2000; supra notes 88-92.

299. Id. at 2003.
300. See Seligmann, supra note 17, at 535 & n.349 (citing Gary S. Gildin, Dis-Qualified
Immunity for DiscriminationAgainst the Disabled, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 897, 898) (noting

that "[piroponents of damages remedies sometimes argue that the threat of damages is
needed to compel recalcitrant school systems to protect and implement the educational rights
of children with disabilities").
301. Stephen C. Shannon, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
Determining "AppropriateRelief' in a Post-GwinnettEra, 85 Va. L. Rev. 853, 874 (1999).
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school personnel to provide a free, appropriate public education for all
who
children with disabilities and the obstacles that face these 30children
2
challenge school districts in court must be taken into account.
30 3
A disproportionate number of disabled youth live in poverty.
Therefore, to parents, the award of costs may matter enormously. Without
potential reimbursement, parents may well lack the services of experts
entirely. As a matter of policy, the incentive of recovering monetary
damages under § 1983 may enable parents to take the time to litigate these
prolonged cases without worrying about recovering for loss or
very often
304
income.
Additionally, as discussed in Winkelman, IDEA litigation requires that
the child, as a result of his or her mental capacity (as a child or disabled
person), have an agent throughout the process. 30 5 In effect, there are two
agents of a disabled child: the child's attorney, and the plaintiff (the parent
or guardian who brings the suit). 306 The current status of IDEA litigation is
that an attorney as agent can recover monetary damages-his fees-but a
child's other agent-his parent or guardian-cannot. 30 7 The fact that a
parent is unable to recover monetary damages creates 30a 8formidable burden
for those seeking to challenge government misconduct.
Parents, like any litigants, will conduct a "cost-benefit analysis" that
results in the decision to pursue the litigation or to acquiesce in the child's
IEP. 30 9 Litigating these cases can take a lot of time and effort by the parent
and child-and, in the case of Matula, school districts have "myriad
opportunities to prolong litigation if [they] stand[] firm in adhering to
[their] proposed IEP. '' 310 Therefore, without providing a compensatory
scheme for parents as well, there may be an incentive for school districts to

302. See id. ("Without an acknowledgment of the disincentives for school personnel to
provide a [free, appropriate public education] for all children with disabilities and the
obstacles facing children who challenge school districts in court, any judicial conclusion
undergirded by public policy considerations will be myopic and ultimately flawed.").
303. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Mary Wagner et al., Dep't of Educ., The Individual and
Household Characteristics of Youth With Disabilities: A Report from the National
Longitudinal Transition Study-2 (NLTS-2), 3-5 (Aug. 2003) (concluding that "25% of
disabled children live in poverty and 65% live in households with incomes less than
The
$50,000")); Mary Wagner et al., SRI International, The Children We Serve:
Demographic Characteristics of Elementary and Middle School Students with Disabilities
at
available
(2002),
28
Households
Their
and
http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELS-ChildrenWe-Serve_.Report.pdf (finding that 36%
of disabled children live in households with incomes of $25,000 or less).
304. See Shannon, supra note 301, at 886-87.
305. See id. at 883-84.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 883.
Id.
See id. at 884.
Id. at 883-84.
Id. at 884.

3094

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

prolong litigation until the parents can no longer litigate as a practical
3 11
matter.
CONCLUSION

The circuits are split on the issue as to whether or not a § 1983 action
should prevail to redress violations of the IDEA. A proper interpretation of
§ 1415(l) and its legislative history supports the conclusion that it clearly
authorizes § 1983 awards predicated under the IDEA. Furthermore, a host
of policy arguments support this conclusion. Either Congress should act to
clarify the 1986 amendment, or the Supreme Court should ultimately decide
that a plaintiff may sue under § 1983 for a violation of the IDEA.

311. See id.

